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Resumen
El presente texto analiza la relación entre la crítica y las ciencias sociales a partir de 
la racionalidad ilustrada planteada por Kant que limita y legitima el conocimiento 
científico, pasando por el juicio racional de segundo grado que cuestiona los 
saberes prácticos de quienes participan directamente en los fenómenos sociales 
objeto de estudio y por las teorías y análisis realizados a partir de la experiencia 
de los dominados, oprimidos y explotados, hasta llegar a la crítica que tiene como 
fundamento el saber y la vida de los otros, la otredad epistemológica.
Palabras clave: crítica, ciencias sociales, hermenéutica, feminismo, marxismo y 
postcolonialidad.
Summary
 This text analyzes the relationship between critique and social sciences from 
the starting point of enlightened rationality proposed by Kant that limits and 
legitimates scientific knowledge, passing through second order rational judgment 
that questions the practical knowledge of those who directly participate in the 
social phenomena that are the object of study, and through the theories and 
analyses performed starting from the experience of the dominated, oppressed and 
exploited, until arriving at the critique whose basis is the knowledge and the life of 
others, epistemological otherness.
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Introduction
Since the structuring of social sciences as a distinct area of knowledge 
that attempts to describe, understand and rationally explain social life, 
critique has fulfilled the role of establishing its limits and possibilities; it 
has demarcated the boundaries of sense, always varying, that separate 
them from other forms of learning. Social sciences even acquire their 
own identity by distancing themselves critically from the knowledge areas 
of the subjects that participate in the phenomena being studied, and 
the value judgments that these subjects must necessarily make in their 
intersubjective relationships. Nevertheless, from Marx’s epistemological 
proposal, critique begins from an external look at social sciences, and 
not from its own rationality. The environment of difference begins to 
transgress its boundaries, taking as a starting point the experience of 
domination, subjection or exploitation of those who are the object of the 
knowledge. The place of the others also becomes the place of critique. 
The emancipation of those who are materially and concretely unable 
to access the rationality promised by science becomes the aim of the 
critique itself. The limits and the objective of social sciences attempt to be 
redefined according to intersubjective self-realization, in virtue of the pos-
sibilities offered by reason with aspirations of universality. Critique ceases 
to be simply internal and innate in social sciences and is assumed as a 
qualifying adjective that denotes the place and evaluative position from 
which scientific knowledge is built. It adds its social disposition to the 
rational nature of science. But the Other, the alternate, is not just a place, 
but rather a way of describing, understanding, explaining and interpreting 
the social world from rationalities that in the midst of power relations, in 
which sciences are also immersed, have been made invisible or hidden. 
When these forms emerge, critique mutates, without losing its previous 
characteristics, into a permanent questioning of science as a manifestation 
of power-knowledge, while at the same time the perspective grows from 
radically changing its limits and possibilities, transforming the rationality 
that sustains it. The theories related to the relationship between critique 
and social sciences, from self-reference to alter-reference, constitute the 
contents of this essay.
Self-referential critique
Social sciences, like all sciences, have been based on a critical preten-
sion since the Enlightenment. According to this pretension, concepts, 
hypotheses, explanations, understandings or scientific methods are, due to 
their own nature, temporary and relative, or absolute only with respect to 
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the temporality in which they are validated by the scientific community, 
or at least by the communities that are dominant within the social field of 
science, in conformance with the parameters established by reason.
Michel Foucault reminds us that Kant (2004), upon defining the En-
lightenment (Aufklärung) as the coming of age in which humanity makes 
use of its own reason without submitting itself to any authority, highlights 
the necessity of critique to “define the conditions under which the use 
of reason is legitimate to determine what can be known, what should be 
done and what can be expected.” (Foucault, 2003:79). Consequently, at 
first instance, critique allows social sciences to elaborate the objective 
and temporary reference points of its internal legitimacy, founded on a 
rationality that in turn is the result of the philosophical critique of reason.
The rational judgment of the epistemological validity of a determined 
area of knowledge that characterizes this critical pretension allows the 
distinction between scientific and non-scientific learning while at the 
same time permitting the definition of science as a system open to its 
own transformation. As a result, the traditional differentiation of social 
sciences with respect to religion and ideology is made starting from this 
critical pretension and the historical criteria that support it, such as logical 
and analytical coherence, empirical falsifiability, interpretative rigor or 
explanatory precision.
Religion and ideology with respect to science are generally considered 
to be forms of knowledge that are presented as timeless and absolute and, 
in consequence, as resistant to change, as they are articulated around a 
closed and circular dogma that justifies itself in virtue of its own form and 
content. Bertrand Russell illustrates with clarity and some political naïveté 
this critical pretension of science and the authority derived from it at the 
dawn of modernity:
The authority of science, recognized by many philosophers of 
the modern era, is something very different from the authority of 
the Church, given that it is intellectual and not governmental. No 
punishment is given to those who reject it; no argument of prudence 
influences those who accept it. It prevails only due to its intrinsic ap-
peal to reason. It is, additionally, a fragmented and partial authority; it 
does not formulate, like Catholic dogma, a complete system that spans 
human morality, human expectations and the past and future history 
of the universe. It only speaks as to what, in time, seems to have been 
scientifically verified; it is a small island in a sea of ignorance. There 
is yet another difference with respect to ecclesiastical authority; 
ecclesiastical authority declares that its affirmations are absolutely true 
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of probability, and they are considered to be subject to modification. 
This creates a frame of mind very different from that of the dogmatic 
medieval. (Russell, 1978:112)
In virtue of this traditional differentiation, dogma in religion appears 
to be transcendent, derived from a cause that is presented as presocial, 
while in ideology it arises as imminent, as the result of a doxa that repro-
duces in a vegetative, asexual way, within a closed system of knowledge. 
The critical pretension in social sciences leans towards self-referential 
critique, towards the permanent questioning of the validity of a piece of 
knowledge as scientific and of the criteria to define such validity, due to 
the temporality and relativity of science; it leans towards the critique of 
science in the name of science, which lends it its specificity as a form of 
learning in the ample field of social knowledge. In the words of Fernando 
Mires:
Recovering the value of the scientific implies performing nothing 
less than a critique of scientific reason itself, or what that reason has 
come to be. To formulate the thesis in another way: the time has come 
to affirm that a science that does not critique itself cannot continue 
to be science. Because if science concerns itself with “new” things, 
an undeniable destructive capacity must be recognized in it, and not 
in the bad sense of the term. A new concept cannot be built without 
destroying, or at least altering, another older one, in the same way that 
it is impossible to make an omelet without breaking an egg. In that 
destructivity, which true scientists perform with certain pleasure, and 
which today is known by the euphemism of “deconstruction”, there is a 
radical incompatibility with respect to religious and ideological beliefs. 
(Mires 2002:99)
Nevertheless, in the power struggle inherent to the scientific field, 
where diverse epistemological currents socially dispute the control of 
truth and the institutional capacity to establish the field’s limits of inclu-
sion/exclusion and the knowledge that characterizes it, the sciences drift 
permanently towards ideologies or towards the dogmatization of the doxa 
that constitute them. This drift is especially marked when the hegemony 
of the dominant epistemological currents is threatened by the emergence 
of a new paradigm, in the terms of Kuhn (2000), or of a new research 
program, in those of Lakatos (1989) or, inversely, when the new paradigm 
or research program aggressively attempts to impose itself within the 
scientific field.
This drift towards ideologization, which contemporaneously has been 
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fundamentally imputed to Marxism and even to Marx, as did Popper 
(1973 and 1982) in the context of the Cold War, within a clear power 
strategy conducive to the political loss of legitimacy of the epistemological 
adversary, may be identified in all scientific currents, from positivism 
to hermeneutics, from empiricism to rationalism or from individualism 
to structuralism. Within this tension between critical tendency and 
ideologization it can be said that a type of knowledge is scientific when it 
has self-referential critique as an epistemological axis and that every social 
science, in order to be considered as such, must be critical.
Hetero-referential critique
In the case of social sciences, this self-referential critique is accom-
panied by hetero-referential critique, related to the necessary distancing 
between scientific knowledge and the social phenomena that are at-
tempted to be studied, understood or explained. As highlighted by Dilthey 
(1986) in his hermeneutic, without abandoning empiricism and positivism, 
these social phenomena are not simply objective, like those of the natural 
or exact sciences, but rather they have clear subjective and intersubjective 
components, within which exist multiple forms of knowledge and interpre-
tation of the same phenomena. The social scientist must distance himself 
from them, and observe them through a lens that allows him to evaluate 
first-order knowledge with second-order validation criteria.
The social scientist needs to contribute to the deciphering of the 
hidden side of social phenomena with respect to those who participate in 
them or the dimensions that are made invisible in social relations or in 
societal production. Hetero-referential critique implies the subjugation of 
social phenomena and the immediate knowledge that conforms them to 
scientific validation criteria, just as Bourdieu understands it for sociology:
It seems to me that the possibilities of contributing to the 
production of the truth depend on two principal factors, which are 
related to the occupied position: the interest one has in knowing 
and making truth known (or inversely, in hiding it and hiding it from 
oneself) and the capacity one has to produce it. Bachelard’s quotation 
is well known: “There is no science but the science of the hidden”. 
The sociologist is better equipped to discover the hidden when he 
is scientifically better equipped, when he better uses the capital of 
concepts, methods, and technique accumulated by his predecessors, 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and many others, and when he is more 
“critical”, when the conscious or unconscious intention that drives 
him is more subversive, when he has more interest in unveiling what 
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social science in general—do not advance faster, it is probably in 
part because these two factors tend to go in the opposite direction. 
(Bourdieu, 1984:22-23)
Within social sciences, the practical knowledge of those who 
participate in the studied phenomena should be subjected to critique, to 
the rational judgment of the investigator, on its function within the power 
relations that make up the social framework. In this case, rationality does 
not play a role of legitimation, as in self-referential critique, but rather of 
revelation; it allows the unraveling of what the subjects of the practical 
knowledge keep in the dark or are incapable of observing, precisely due 
to its subjective implication. The absence of hetero-referential critique 
annuls the pertinence to social sciences or, more precisely, to the forms of 
knowledge that attempt to present themselves clothed as social sciences, 
as it becomes a simple repetition or synthesis of first-order knowledge of 
the actors who directly participate in the production of social life.
Exo-referential critique
These two types of epistemological critique, self-referential and 
hetero-referential, with differing variables, are generally accepted as 
constitutive of the contemporary social sciences because, as we have seen, 
they define their specificity and pertinence. In relation to them, stating 
that a social science is critical becomes tautological.
The same cannot be said of exo-referential critique that is made from 
a political and ethical position external to scientific knowledge or to the 
subject/object relationship within social sciences. This type of critique, 
which originates from Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of the Political 
Economy and is developed by different generations of the Frankfurt 
School, recovers its vitality at the beginning of this century, after the 
epistemological silences caused by the Habermasian turn towards com-
municative action and language, and by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
dismantling of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. Witness of this 
was given in two works produced in different cultural contexts, that of 
Axel Honneth that contains his reflections on social pathologies, the soci-
ety of disdain and the struggle for recognition (Honneth, 1997 and 2006), 
and the discussion in the pages of Cuaderno de Herramientas nº 1 of the 
Argentine magazine Herramientas, about an article by Enrique Dussel 
published in 1999 and titled “Marxism and epistemology: Karl Marx’s 
scientific research program (Functional and critical social science)”.
The launching point of exo-referential critique is topological 
and evaluative. It is related to the position from which questions are 
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 formulated for social sciences and topics of scientific research are selected. 
An author such as Weber (1982), in spite of insisting on axiological 
neutrality or disengagement (Wertfreiheit), highlighted the impossibility 
of avoiding the axiological reference (Wertbeziehung) on the part of the 
researcher in the first phase of research in social sciences, regarding the 
place where these are considered. This brings him to assume an evaluative 
position. Weber tried in vain to make the effects of these references on 
scientific knowledge relative, considering them to be simply hypotheti-
cal and differentiating them from value judgments (Werturteile), of a 
categorical nature. Nevertheless, he could not avoid the fact that every 
evaluative reference biases the eye of the observer (Lamo de Espinosa et 
al., 1994:88; Muñoz Torres, 2002:163-164).
But it is in the Frankfurt School, particularly based on the 
Horkheimer approach, as highlighted by Honneth (2006:183), where 
critical theory is seen as the “intellectual side of the historical process 
of emancipation”, that is, as a form of knowledge that is supported by a 
“prescientific experience”, which implies an emancipating interest in the 
existence of “driving social forces that, in the historical process, tend to 
critique and overcome established forms of domination” and are directed 
towards a future political practice (ibídem).
In Dussel’s argument this position and evaluation is remitted to the 
original negation:
The “negativity” of which we speak, in the first place, is the 
“cannot-live” of the oppressed, exploited, of the “victims”—to speak as 
Walter Benjamin or Emmanuel Levinas—(in the text: “the workers”). 
It is what we have called in other works the “original negation”—es-
pecially, in the modern globalization process of capitalism expressed 
in the misery of the peripheral countries, of Brazil, Mexico and today 
also Argentina, of Kenya or Nigeria, India or the Philippines. Without 
considering “negativity” there cannot be critical social science. 
(Dussel, 1999b)
It can be seen that in both cases critique sets off from some actors 
and an experience external to science. It is thus exo-referential, and this 
can be the proletariat, social movements, the oppressed, the exploited or 
victims of human rights violations, and from the practical and theoretical 
interest that they have in their own emancipation.
Nevertheless, the concept of negativity has different implications in 
the Frankfurt School and in Dussel’s arguments. For the latter, negativity 
originates in the “cannot-live” of those who are subjected to a domina-
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 trans-systemic, that is, made from the critical outside of the capitalist 
system, and that would form part of a fate of objective ethic:
There is a second sense of “stealing”: b) “Stealing” as a “critical” 
judgment, not just intra-systemic but rather trans-systemic. It concerns 
a kind of judgment that is enunciated by a subject who is situated 
“outside” of the horizon of the world of the capitalist system (just as, 
for A. Smith, the capitalist for was “outside” of the slavery system, 
etc.). I call this type of “practical and critical judgment” “ethical” (no 
longer “moral”, and as I have indicated it has nothing to do with “value 
judgments”, but rather it sets off from the legislation of empirical judg-
ments on the corporal and living human being from which scientific 
“explanations” or equally scientific hermeneutical “understandings” 
can be developed). (Dussel, 2001)
The weakness of this objective ethic is evident, as it ends up being 
presented as a fate of scientific ethic safe from critique, which also serves 
as the foundation of a critical science. In this way the circular nature 
of the argumentation results in darkening the basis of exo-referential 
critique, sending it to a fate of social metaphysics.
In the Frankfurt School, as analyzed by Honneth, the reference to 
the beginnings of social justice is insufficient to form the basis of a critical 
theory; for this reason, the reflection sends us to “the violation of the 
conditions of the good life”, derived from a deficit of social rationality that 
denies the possibilities of intersubjective self-realization1. In the same 
philosophical line of the Hegelian and Marxist left it is considered that the 
organization of society in capitalism impedes the complete fulfillment of 
a universal rationality that has been developed by the productive forces 
of the same society or in the case of Habermas by the communicative con-
sensus. Consequently, the social pathologies from which the exo-referen-
tial critique is built would settle in the “detours with respect to the ideal 
to be reached through the fulfillment of rational universality” (Honneth, 
2006:104-109). Nevertheless, as Honneth himself notes, in Habermas’ 
philosophy the rationality that would lead to communicative consensus 
would only guarantee the conditions for an autonomous self-realization 
and not the self-realization itself. In other words, within the Frankfurt 
School, the position from which a critical social science is formed has as 
an objective reference the existence of a historically produced potential 
and universal rationality, which those who are subjected to relationships 
1. The sharpest proposal about negativity as a critical force and the most distorted and 
misunderstood in: Adorno & Horkheimer (1987).
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of capitalist domination that deny their self-realization cannot access. The 
search for this self-realization would imply a process of emancipation that 
intellectually would be complemented by critical social science.
The Hegelian assumption of the existence of a rational universality or 
of a potentially achievable rational universality, that is in this case im-
peded by capitalism or by the systemic colonization of the world of life, 
ends up becoming a very heavy burden for the critical social sciences, the 
“intellectual side of the historical process of emancipation”. Critical social 
sciences must alone assume the task of human self-realization through 
the contributions of knowledge to the emancipation from work with 
respect to capital or by way of the construction of a universally inclusive 
consensus based on communicative action. This enormous responsibility 
is derived from relegating the knowledge of the subalternate or subordi-
nate subjects to a residual intellectual terrain as part of a “pre-scientific 
experience”.
Dussel is located partially within the first perspective. He establishes 
as a second characteristic of social sciences its materiality, which is found 
“in the contents of the praxis in what refers to the production, reproduc-
tion and development of human life, of human corporality. We are not 
angels, nor souls, nor stones: we are corporal beings that live and die, and 
therefore we must eat, drink, get dressed, study, produce artwork… and 
a few other things. It is in that level that “negativity” (alienation) appears 
as “materiality”: misery (for Marx), pulsional repression (for Freud), bank 
pedagogy (for Freire), etc.” (Dussel, 1999a). The materiality of scientific 
knowledge would be a part of the subordinated and blinded life of the 
oppressed, exploited or dominated.
Honneth is within the second perspective, and he considers to be 
limited both the material perspective, as it does not explain the set of 
actors who suffer from social disdain, that is, the absence of social recog-
nition, and the communicative action and the recourse to the pragmatism 
of language (to the pragmatic linguistic) in Habermas, due to its formalist 
character and the exclusion of the experience of the subordinated actors 
as the basis of exo-referential critique. Honneth proposes to resume the 
path of conflict as constitutive of society and base critical theory on the 
struggle for recognition, that is also a struggle for own identities. Starting 
from the analysis of the interdisciplinary studies of social movements and 
anti-establishment collective actions, he arrives at the conclusion that the 
normative heart of the ideas of justice of those who protest is “constituted 
by relative expectations with regard to their own dignity, honor, or 
integrity. If the results are generalized making an abstraction of the 
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recognition is the normative condition of every communicational activity; 
in effect, the subjects are on the horizon of a reciprocal expectation of 
being recognized at the same time as moral persons and because of the 
social activities they perform.” (ibídem, 192). The concept of recognition, 
also with Hegelian roots, becomes the nucleus that serves to define 
exo-referential critique in social sciences.
Honneth thus rescues the “pre-scientific” experience of social move-
ments and of collective protest actions as a basis for scientific critique, 
but simultaneously attempts to seek in communicative action the rational 
process to achieve social recognition and, as a result, emancipation. Like-
wise, he reexamines work, which had lost all its importance in the philoso-
phy of Habermas, as a fundamental element in the struggle for recognition 
and fuses in this way the materiality and the formality of critique: “In 
effect, the point to which the cultural definition of the hierarchies of tasks 
determines the degree of social esteem that the individual may obtain 
from his activity and the qualities associated with it, the possibilities of 
the formation of an individual identity, passing through the experience of 
recognition, are directly related with the handing out and distribution of 
work” (ibídem, 200).
Honneth’s proposal to understand exo-referential critique in social 
sciences resumes the tradition of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt 
School and posits alternatives to exceed its internal limits, the same as 
those of Dussel’s proposal. If the fundamental reference for a critical social 
science is the position of those who are subordinated within the dominant 
power relations in contemporary society and the impossibility of their self-
realization, the relationship between capital and work does not appear to 
be sufficient to provide a basis for critique, as it would exclude the majority 
of the subordinates, and more so when work has broken the boundaries of 
the salaried world and has deeply penetrated the world of human life, just 
as Paolo Virno highlights when he states that the core of the biopolitics lies 
in the domain of the life of the worker, of his dynamism2. In such a way, 
2. “The capitalist is interested in the life of the worker, his body, only for an indirect 
motive: this body, this life, is that which contains the ability, the force, the dynamis […] 
Life is placed in the center of politics in the extent that what is at play is the force of 
immaterial work (which is not present in itself). For this reason, and only for this reason, 
it is reasonable to talk about ‘biopolitics’. The living body, with which the administrative 
apparatuses of the State concern themselves, is the tangible sign of an unrealized force, 
the pretense of work not yet objectified or, as Marx says in a very beautiful expression, 
of ‘work as subjectivity’. The power to work, bought and sold along with all other 
merchandise, is work not yet objectified, ‘work as subjectivity’. It could be said that, while 
money is the universal representative of the value of exchange, the condition that makes 
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negativity and recognition would constitute the basis of exo-referential 
critique; however, scientific knowledge would still be the intellectual side 
of emancipation, as if the social knowledge of the subordinates or subalter-
nates did not exist.
Altero-referential critique
The need for recognition from the other subordinate goes much fur-
ther than what Honneth supposes. It cannot be reduced to being accepted 
as a unique member with equal rights within a determined society; it also 
implies that its forms of knowledge, its life experiences and its culture 
have the guarantees for their full development and for the establishment 
of a horizontal dialogue such as that which Gadamer (2006, 2007)3 would 
suggest with social sciences and with scientific reason that would permit 
mutual transformation; consequently, that would not be relegated to a 
secondary plain, a subordinate and “pre-scientific” place.
This is how, for example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos understands 
it when he proposes a new paradigm, the diatopical hermeneutic, to 
definitively overcome what he calls epistemicide:
The new paradigm constitutes an alternative for each one of 
these traits. In the first place, in its terms there is no unique form 
of valid knowledge. There are many forms of knowledge, as many as 
there are social practices that generate and sustain them. Modern 
science supports itself on a practice of professional and social technical 
division of work in the infinite technological development of the 
productive forces, of which capitalism is today the only example. 
Alternative social practices generate alternatives forms of knowledge. 
Not recognizing these forms of knowledge implies questioning the 
legitimacy of the social practices that support them and, in that 
sense, promoting the social exclusion of those who promote them. 
The genocide that so many times accompanied European expansion 
was also an epistemicide: strange towns were eliminated because 
they had strange forms of knowledge and strange forms of knowledge 
were eliminated because they were based on strange social practices 
and in strange towns. But the epistemicide was much more extensive 
than the genocide because it occurred whenever it was attempted to 
subalternate, subordinate, marginalize or legalize social practices and 
possible the exchange of products and life functions as the power to produce, the invisible 
dynamis.” (Virno, 2003:87-88)
3. On the relationship between hermeneutic philosophy and social sciences see Bauman 
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groups that could constitute a threat to capitalist expansion, or during 
a good part of our century, to communist expansion (in this subject, as 
modern as capitalism). It was also more extensive because it occurred 
in non-European peripheral space as well as in European and North 
American central space, against workers, indigenous persons, blacks, 
women and minorities in general (ethnic, religious, sexual). (De Sousa 
Santos, 1998:491)4
In this case about the point is not a recognition in the equality of the 
dominator, but rather a recognition in difference and diversity (Geertz, 
1994, 1996, 2001), where the subordinates are not a simple topological or 
evaluative reference for the critical scientist, but rather a full subjectivity 
that posits its own questions to science, to which science must be open to 
change even its criteria of falsifiability or rigor.
In the same sense, Walter Mignolo, following the lead of Edward Said 
(2006), tells us about “a thought in and of the colonial difference that 
diversality (epistemic diversity as a universal project) postulates, and no 
longer the search for new abstract universalities of the left or right” (Mi-
gnolo, 2001:18). Mignolo takes as an illustrative case that of the liberation 
philosophy of Dussel who, despite not including this characteristic within 
his specific analysis of the critical social sciences, develops it in his pioneer 
works on modernity and post-colonialism (Dussel, 1995, 1999, 2001).
Both Mignolo and de Sousa Santos discuss another necessary 
component of the critical social sciences, that of alterity or otherness5, that 
of the existence of other forms of knowledge, interpretation and explana-
tion of society that do not only perform the function of changing the 
epistemological perspective of the researcher, as in the traditional Critical 
Theory, but rather question science itself as a substantial part of power 
relations, just as Foucault and Fals Borda (1984, 1986 and 1987) did in the 
second half of the last century, through genealogy and archaeology and 
participatory action research, respectively. They contribute in this way to 
set the foundation for an altero-referential critique that departs from the 
knowledge of the subordinates or subalternates, of the others.
From different theoretical and epistemological perspectives, 
subordinate studies and those of post-coloniality, or different feminist 
currents, both of equality and of difference, contemporaneously structure 
this altero-referential critique. Speculum of the Other Woman by Luce 
4. Further development of this hermeneutic proposal in De Sousa Santos (2003).
5. For this reason Derrida and Levinas constitute a constant philosophical reference of 
self-referential critique.
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Irigaray (2007) constitutes from its very structure as a form of knowledge 
an affirmation of alterity, just as the distinction that Seyla Benhabib 
makes between the generalized other and the concrete other, which 
illustrates the alternate approach from a feminist standpoint:
The point of view of the generalized other demands that we look 
at each and every individual as a rational being to whom corresponds 
the same rights and duties that we would like to attribute to ourselves. 
When we assume this point of view, we isolate ourselves from the 
individuality and concrete identity of the other. We take for granted 
that the other, just like ourselves, is a being that has necessities, 
desires and concrete affections, but what constitutes his moral dignity 
is not what makes us different from each other, but rather what 
we have in common, and speaking agents and rational actors. Our 
relationship is governed by the rules of equality and formal reciproc-
ity: each one has the right to expect and assume from us the same 
thing that we expect and assume from him or her. […] The categories 
of morals that accompany such actions are justice, obligation, law and 
the corresponding moral sentiments are those of respect, duty, value 
and dignity. 
 The point of view of the concrete other, on the other hand, makes 
us view each rational being as an individual with a story, identity 
and concrete emotional-affective construction. When we assume 
this point of view we separate ourselves from that which constitutes 
what is common among us and we focus on individuality. We try to 
understand the necessities of the other, his motivations, what he seeks 
and what he desires. Our relationship with the other is governed by 
the rules of equity and complementary reciprocity: each individual 
has the right to expect and assume manners of conduct in the other 
through which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete 
individual with specific necessities, aptitudes and capabilities. Our 
differences in this case complement each other more than they 
exclude each other. […] The moral categories that accompany such 
interactions are those of responsibility, bonding and the desire to 
share. The moral feelings that accompany such interactions are love, 
care and sympathy and solidarity. (Benhabib, 2006:182-183)
As Foucault was already announcing in 1983, altero-referential critique 
is born from a transgression (franchissement) of scientific knowledge 
and not just of its limitation and legitimation as happened with the 
self-referential critique of Kantian inspiration, of the revelation typical 
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referential critique. The point of departure of this type of critique is, in 
the words of Foucault, archaeological in method, in the extent that it treats 
scientific knowledge as a historic event that constitutes us as subjects of 
knowledge within a determined temporality, and genealogical in purpose, 
“in the sense that it will not infer from the form what we are, what is 
impossible for us to do or know; but rather it extracts, from the contingency 
that has made us be what we are, the possibility of not being, of not doing, 
of not thinking, for more time, what we are, what we do, what we think.” 
(Foucault, 2003:91-92). Critique from the viewpoint of otherness converts 
knowledge into an “indefinite work of freedom” (Ibídem), which permits 
the transformation of science and its rationality from the knowledge areas 
that in a certain historical time are not considered scientific.6
Conclusions
The critical nature of social sciences arises from ascertaining the lim-
its of reason, due to the temporality and relativity of human knowledge, 
to understand oneself and to understand, interpret and explain social life. 
Likewise, it arises from the necessity to build intersubjective reference 
points with pretensions of objectivity within relativity, in order to become 
aware of the social world and act in society with a greater degree of 
certainty or with a lesser degree of uncertainty. With this cognoscitive 
horizon, self-referential critique, after the fall of religion and the decline 
of the metaphysical as models of interpretation of social life, offers the 
instruments to establish the limits of scientific knowledge and the related 
objectives for its legitimation.
Amid the search for temporary certainties, social sciences are also 
built on the distrust of practical knowledge areas. The necessity to subject 
the knowledge of the diverse subjects implied in the social phenomena 
being studied to the rational judgment of the researcher led to the struc-
6. “The dialogue of social sciences with life is closely related to the dialogue of social 
sciences with themselves. Therefore, dialogue does not only involve an ethical and 
political imperative with respect to the marginalized visions of social knowledge, but 
rather it also implies an opening of the scientific practices that tolerates and promotes, 
within sciences, the presence of distinct interpretations of what is social. In this sense, 
research on social life cannot fail to recognize today that it must lend its voice to the 
dialogue that is being held between diverse forms of scientific thought. Each research 
study on social life, then, should intend to be a horizon that includes differences, that 
accepts designs, that recovers them with the understanding of the social phenomenon 
that is being studied in mind; in the end, as a horizon that allows the awareness of the 
historicity of the interpretations that have contributed before it to the construction of the 
research problem.” (Herrera, 2007:144)
81
Crítica y ciencias sociales Leopoldo M
únera R
uiz
C I ENC I A POL Í T I CA Nº 10    JUL I O-DI C I EMBRE  2010 
I SSN 1909-230X/PÁGS. 66-83
turing of a hetero-referential critique that would allow for the elaboration 
of a second-order knowledge to reveal the hidden side of social life, by 
way of an exercise in distancing with respect to such practical knowledge 
areas.
Paradoxically, from the experiences of those who live in the world 
from which scientists distance themselves, there arises a critique that 
highlights the social boundaries of scientific rationality and the neces-
sity for it to function not only to understand reality, but to transform 
it as a function of those who, due to their subordination, do not have 
the possibility to access the new world offered by it or to construct an 
alternative one. Consequently, the negativity of the life of the subordi-
nated and the imperative of recognition structure this exo-referential 
critique.
Nevertheless, the life of others is not only negativity; it also implies 
forms of knowledge that revindicate their own rationalities and evidence 
the imbrications of social sciences in the power relations from which 
they fruitlessly try to escape. From an altero-referential critique, practi-
cal knowledge areas reclaim the possibility of questioning dominant 
rationalities to construct more comprehensive forms of social knowledge 
and a scientific reason that veers away from its focus on narcissistic 
self-observation and opens itself to the heterogenous glance of those who 
have been excluded from its rational universe, in order to be able to truly 
observe itself.
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